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PROTECTING CHILDREN BY PRESERVING PARENTHOOD
Jane C. Murphy*
INTRODUCTION
Establishing legal parentage, once a relatively straightforward matter of marriage
and biology, has become increasingly complex. The determination of legal status as
mother may now involve several women making claims based on genetic contribution,
contract, status as gestational carrier, or other bases.' Paternity cases, while a more
established segment of the court docket, have also become more complex. The weak-
ening of the marital presumption, increased accessibility and reliability of genetic test-
ing, and the rise in children born outside of marriage have made court intervention in
paternity establishment more common.2
Cases involving the law's role in resolving parentage issues arise in a variety of
contexts. Much has been written about the appropriate legal standards in cases involv-
ing competing claims of parenthood. In these "competing claims" cases, courts or
legislatures are called upon to confer rights and responsibilities among two or more
adults seeking to assume the emotional, financial, and care-taking role in a child's
life.4 Some of these cases involve garden-variety adultery in which a father discovers
* Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law; B.A. 1975, Boston College;
J.D. 1978, New York University School of Law. I wish to thank the participants of William
& Mary School of Law's Institute of Bill of Rights Law Roundtable on Reform of Parentage
Law for their comments on an earlier draft of this Article and James Dwyer for organizing
and leading the Roundtable. I also thank Christina Gochnour and Elizabeth Hiatt for their
excellent research assistance.
' See, e.g., R. Alta Charo, And Baby Makes Three- or Four, or Five, or Six: Redefining
the Family After the Reprotech Revolution, 15 WIs. WOMEN'S L.J. 231 (2000); Melanie B.
Jacobs, Micah Has One Mommy and One Legal Stranger: Adjudicating Maternity for
Nonbiological Lesbian Coparents, 50 BUFF. L. REv. 341 (2002); Amy M. Larkey, Redefining
Motherhood: Determining Legal Maternity in Gestational Surrogacy Arrangements, 51
DRAKE L. REV. 605 (2003).
2 See, e.g., Theresa Glennon, Somebody's Child: Evaluating the Erosion of the Marital
Presumption of Paternity, 102 W. VA. L. REv. 547 (2000); Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images
of Fatherhood: Welfare Reform, Child Support Enforcement, and Fatherless Children, 81
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 325 (2005).
3 See supra notes 1-2; see also Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention:
Assisted Reproduction and the Functional Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597,
602 (2002) (noting that the circumstances contributing to the "fragmentation of parentage"
on both the maternal and paternal sides can result in as many as eight potential parents).
' See infra notes 8-13 and accompanying text.
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
he is not the biological father of a child born during his marriage to the child's mother.5
Increasingly, however, competing claims cases involve parental relationships created
from artificial reproductive technology (ART), or adoption, or both.6 These cases
occur in a variety of family structures: families with heterosexual married parents,
same sex couples, and single parents. What they all have in common is that, given the
costs of the legal or medical interventions involved, there are, among the claimants,
at least one or two potential parents with substantial resources.
The debate about the best choice for children when adults are competing for
parental status is ongoing, lively, and filled with many voices. There are a variety of
options presented tojudges or lawmakers in these situations. They can take an all-or-
nothing approach and assign exclusive parenthood to one adult based upon a range
of factors, including marital status,' biology,9 contractual intent," history of care-
taking," and emotional attachment with the child.' 2 Or the law can allow more than
' Unfortunately many of these adultery cases result in proceedings to disestablish rather
than to preserve or establish paternity. But some end up as contests between the marital and
biological fathers. See, e.g., Evans v. Wilson, 856 A.2d 679 (Md. 2004) (denying a paramour's
attempt to establish paternity in light of the mother's husband's status as the legal father).
6 Div. OF REPROD. HEALTH, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION & SOC'Y FOR
ASSISTED REPROD. TECH, AM. SOC'Y FOR REPROD. MED., 2001 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES: NATIONAL SUMMARY AND FERTILITY CLINIC REPORTS 3
(2003), available athttp://www.cdc.gov/ART/ARTOlIPDF/ART2001.pdf (noting that "ART
includes all fertility treatments in which both eggs and sperm are handled," including in vitro
fertilization, gamete intrafallopian transfer, and zygote intrafallopian transfer).
7 This conclusion is drawn from information about the extraordinary costs of artificial
reproductive technology and, to a lesser extent, the costs of private adoption. See, e.g., Lori
B. Andrews, Reproductive Technology Comes ofAge, 21 WHrrIERL. REV. 375,377 (1999)
(describing the reproductive technology industry as having revenue exceeding four billion
dollars annually); Katherine T. Pratt, Inconceivable?, Deducting the Costs of Fertility Treatment,
89 CORNELLL. REV. 1121, 1135-38 (2004) (describing the high costs of fertility treatments,
as well as the fact that they are not usually covered by insurance, and analyzing the deduct-
ibility of such costs for federal income tax purposes); Kathy M. Kristof, Aid Is Available to
Help Ease Adoption Burden, L.A. TIMES, July 31,2005, at C2 (describing the efforts to assist
parents with the high cost of private adoption and reporting that "[r]oughly 100,000 parents adopt
in the U.S. each year, spending as much as $40,000 in the process.").
8 See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
9 One of the competing claims cases in which the biological parents "won" that captured
media attention came to be known as the "Baby Jessica" case. See In re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d
649 (Mich. 1993).
1o See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993); see also Storrow, supra note 3, at 602.
" AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.18 (2000) (placing care-taking on the same level as marriage and
biology in establishing parental rights).
12 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.119 (West 2001) (granting rights to a "person who estab-
lishes emotional ties creating child-parent relationship or ongoing personal relationship").
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one adult to share the rights and responsibilities of being a father or mother. 3 While
courts have taken a variety of approaches in resolving these cases, decisions usually
turn on interpretations of contracts, custody, adoption, or parentage law.' 4 Increas-
ingly, the principles in the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) 5 or state variants of the
UPA 6 are being adapted to address these cases.
Less attention has been paid to a much larger, second category of cases - cases
in which the law is faced with resolving the legal status of the one adult who may be
available to serve as the legal mother or father. For fathers, these cases frequently
arise in the context of establishing (or, in some cases, disestablishing) the paternity
of children of unmarried parents. 17 For mothers, these cases most often arise in the
context of determining their legal status as biological mothers when the state has
identified them as being at risk for abusing or neglecting their children.18 These cases
almost always involve mothers or fathers who are poor, often members of minority
groups, and usually without legal representation in parentage establishment and/or
disestablishment proceedings.' 9 In these "orphan" cases, the governing rules or legal
standards chosen by the legislature or courts will not be used to choose among
potential parents; rather, the issue is whether anyone will serve as a child's parent.
The law's response in both categories of cases will have an impact on the welfare
of the children involved. In competing claims cases, the best interests of children
seem to be served by policies that preserve relationships between children and the fit,
loving adults in their lives rather than policies that rely on narrow definitions of
parenthood based on marriage or biology alone.2° But "competing claims" cases, while
capturing vast resources of the legal system and vast space in legal scholarship, have
significantly different implications for child welfare than those cases where the
decision can leave a child fatherless or motherless. While the adults involved may
"3 See, e.g., Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005) (holding that a child born
to a same sex couple can have two mothers, both of whom have custody rights and support
obligations).
" See Storrow, supra note 3, at 603-612, 623-33 (summarizing the literature and analyz-
ing statutes and cases in which there are multiple contenders for legal mother and legal father).
15 Uniform Parentage Act of 2000 (2002), available athttp://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/
upa/final2002.htm.
16 See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7575 (West 2005); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 3 (West
1998); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.300 (West 2002).
17 See infra text accompanying note 72.
"a See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
20 See, e.g., Matthew M. Kavanagh, Rewriting the Legal Family: Beyond Exclusivity to a
Care-Based Standard, 16 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 83, 143 (2004); see also Gilbert A. Holmes,
The Tie that Binds: The Constitutional Right of Children to Maintain Relationships with
Parent-Like Individuals, 53 MD. L. REV. 358 (1994); Alison Harvison Young, Reconceiving
the Family: Challenging the Paradigm of the Exclusive Family, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL'Y & L. 505 (1998).
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be devastated by any legal action limiting contact with children they love, children
have proven to be surprisingly resilient in circumstances where several adults are
fighting to stay in their lives.2' Making the "wrong choice" when deciding among
potential volunteers for parenthood, therefore, presents fewer risks to the welfare of
a child than a decision that may leave a child without any father or mother. Legal
decisions that leave children permanently without a parent - without even a name
to attach to mother or father - can have devastating effects on children.22 The harm
is financial, emotional, and psychological.23 If our goal is to develop parentage laws
that have child welfare as their central goal, we must focus greater attention on those
cases that have the potential to leave a child motherless or fatherless or both. Reform-
ing parentage laws must begin with recognition that poor families experience the estab-
lishment and disestablishment of parentage differently from families with greater
economic resources. For poor families, parentage issues are not usually resolved by
careful and nuanced readings of private contracts or the UPA in proceedings where
all parties are represented in full-fledged trials through appellate review. Rather, these
issues get resolved in the crowded halls of hospitals, welfare offices, and juvenile
courts where caseloads are large and few parties have lawyers.24 While child welfare
is certainly an articulated goal of the governing law in these cases, this goal is often
secondary to recouping state funds, ensuring "fairness" to non-biological fathers, and
punishing "bad" mothers.
I have argued elsewhere that the recent trends in child support and welfare law
have put children at risk of losing fathers. 25 These trends have resulted in a new defi-
nition of fatherhood based solely upon biology and are an
21 See, e.g., Brian Dickerson, A Child's Life Shows Folly ofAdults, Media, DETROrrFREE
PRESS, Feb. 24, 2003 (describing "Baby Jessica" nine years after being taken from her pre-
adoptive home to live with her biological father as "a self-possessed 12-year-old who adores
her parents" and "recognize [s] that in a world where many children lack even a single adult
who cares about them, she and her sister have lucked out"), available at http://law.gsu.edu/
ecunningham/PR/JessicaUpdates.htm.
The potential for harm for children in "competing claims" cases will, of course, vary de-
pending upon a variety of circumstances, including the level of and exposure to conflict, the
age of the child, and the nature of the relationship with the claimants. See PSYCHOLOGY AND
CHILD CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS 115 (Lois A. Weithom ed., 1987).
22 At the University of Baltimore, the author directed a family law clinical program from
1990-2004. See University of Baltimore School of Law Family Law Clinic, http://law.ubalt.
edu/clinics/familylaw.html (last visited Feb. 20,2006). The caseload included representation
of children and parents in paternity establishment and disestablishment cases as well as abuse
and neglect cases.
23 See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 2, at 365-69 (describing a case study from Maryland).
24 See GUGGENHEIM, infra note 59.
25 See Murphy, supra note 2. For similar arguments, see Melanie B. Jacobs, When Daddy
Doesn't Want to Be Daddy Anymore: An Argument Against Paternity Fraud Claims, 16
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 193 (2004), and Paula Roberts, Truth and Consequences (pts. 1-3),
37 FAM. L.Q. 35, 55, 69 (2003).
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unintended consequence[] of three decades of... legislation de-
signed to reform the nation's welfare system .... [A]pplied most
aggressively against low-income fathers of children receiving
public benefits, welfare-driven child support policies are pushing
those fathers to seek disestablishment of paternity. In resolving
these claims, courts and legislatures are reinstating... a definition
of fatherhood grounded in biology that ignores other potential bases
for fatherhood-based caretaking. As a result, children are becom-
ing fatherless ... 26
While reversing these developments may require a fundamental shift in our approach
to welfare, I have argued for incremental changes in child support and public benefits
law to achieve "the overarching goal of keeping fathers in children's lives."27
In this Article, the focus shifts to mothers and the laws that establish and dis-
establish the maternal rights of poor women. The Article examines patterns of state
intervention in child abuse and neglect law that determine the legal recognition of
motherhood for these women. It concludes that current child welfare rules and
policies promote the loss of birthmothers in poor children's lives, often with no long-
term maternal substitute for affected children. The Article also notes that focusing
on parentage laws alone cannot preserve fit mothers (or fathers) in children's lives.
Notwithstanding the limitations of this exercise, the Article highlights the policies
that have removed mothers from their children and urges a shift in policy direction.
Finally, the Article concludes with some principles to guide the formulation of
parentage laws that have as their primary goal protecting poor children by keeping
mothers in their lives.
I. ESTABLISHING AND PRESERVING THE LEGAL STATUS OF MOTHERS
Historically, the maternal presumption provided that a woman who gives birth to
a child is that child's mother under the law.28 This presumption no longer answers all
issues concerning the legal status of mothers. While the UPA and its state variants29
are beginning to displace this assumption to resolve issues concerning maternal status,
the application of such rules is primarily relevant to competing claims in cases involv-
ing same sex partners, ART, or both. For poor women and children, the laws that
26 Murphy, supra note 2, at 329-30 (footnotes omitted).
27 Id. at 331.
28 Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (holding that a woman's maternity is verifiable
from the birth itself).
29 See supra note 16.
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determine maternal status are more often those federal3" and state3' laws that authorize
the state to remove children, often as infants, and to terminate maternal parental rights.
A. The Diminishing Impact of Biology and Its Impact on Children
For low-income men, biology (and economic support) has increasingly defined
fatherhood under the law.32 For poor women, the legal definition of motherhood seems
to be moving in the opposite direction. Many would argue that the biological con-
nection between mothers and children is even more profound than that between
biological fathers and their children.33 Despite this, biology is de-emphasized under
current child welfare law, the law that most frequently defines motherhood for poor
women. For children of poor biological mothers, the maternal presumption of legal
parenthood at birth is being increasingly displaced under federal and state child wel-
fare law by an idealized notion of motherhood to be created and recognized through
adoption.
Poor women, particularly African American women, have a history of losing
their children in juvenile court child protection proceedings. This history is well-
documented:
[F]rom their inception, child welfare programs focused on poor
children. The children of single mothers (particularly women of
30 Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified
as amended in scatted sections of 42 U.S.C.).
" State laws governing child protection proceedings are often divided between those stan-
dards, usually vague and indeterminate, that permit removal of children and somewhat more
specific standards that permit termination of parental rights. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTS.
& JUD. PROC. § § 3-801-830 (LexisNexis 2006) (governing the removal of children for alleged
abuse or neglect); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-301 (LexisNexis 2006) (governing the
termination of parental rights).
32 See generally Murphy, supra note 2.
3 See, e.g., Nancy Erickson, The Mother's Rights Must Take Priority, 2 L. & INEQ. 447
(1984). Of course, in the rarified world of ART, where the biological connection may be
limited to egg donation, there may be no difference grounded in biology between the maternal
and paternal child bond.
34 When parental rights are terminated to make a child theoretically available for adop-
tion, the parental rights of biological fathers are also terminated. But, for a variety of reasons,
the cases that end up in child welfare proceedings rarely involve fathers who are actively
involved with their children and, thus, do not have the same impact on children's relationship
with fathers. See Leigh Goodmark, Achieving BattererAccountability in the Child Protection
System, 93 KY. L.J. 613, 614-15 (2004); Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Motherhood:
Conflicting Definitions from Welfare "Reform," Family, and Criminal Law, 83 CORNEILL.
REv. 689, 708-09 (1998) (attributing the lack of participation of fathers in child protection
proceedings to the fact that women are more often primary caretakers and noting that in child
protection cases, very little attention is paid by the state to ensuring fathers' presence).
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color) are particularly at risk of removal. Living in a single-parent
household increases the risk that a child will live in poverty. Both
poverty and the loss of regular contact with both parents pose
risks to child welfare. Many commentators have suggested, how-
ever, that intervention results, at least in part, from the child
welfare system's adherence to the traditional idealized definition
of the "good mother" rather than from thorough investigations and
documentation of child abuse and neglect.
For example, Bernardine Dohm has explained:
From the beginning, the juvenile courts and the broader social
welfare system intervened in the lives of destitute women to regu-
late and monitor their behavior, punish them for "deviant" mother-
ing practices, and police the undeserving poor. Women were
locked at the center of the private sphere of the family; their sole
responsibility was to produce healthy offspring and provide for the
well-being of men. Poor women, single women, and women who
worked outside the home failed, by definition, to meet this respon-
sibility. The legal and social welfare apparatus developed to regu-
late and punish these "bad" mothers by "saving" their children.36
This bias against poor mothers has increased as the emphasis in such proceedings
has shifted from preservation of the birthfamily to swifter termination of parental
rights and adoption.37 Child advocates, social scientists, and legislators have long
recognized that allowing children who have been removed from their mother's care
to move from placement to placement in "foster care drift" is harmful to children.38
Study after study demonstrates the importance of permanency39 and the dangers of
35 Murphy, supra note 34, at 708-09 (footnotes omitted).
36 Id. at 709 (quoting Bernardine Dohm, Bad Mothers, Good Mothers, and the State:
Children at the Margins, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 1, 6 (1995) (footnotes omitted)).
31 See Mary O'Flynn, The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997: Changing Child
Welfare WithoutAddressing Parental Substance Abuse, 16 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y
243, 247 (1999); Dorothy E. Roberts, Poverty, Race, and New Directions in Child Welfare
Policy, 1 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 63, 64 (1999); Deborah L. Sanders, Toward Creating a
Policy of Permanence for America's Disposable Children: The Evolution of Federal Foster
Care Funding Statutes from 1961 to Present, 29 J. LEGIS. 51, 72 (2002).
38 See Marsha Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 STAN. L. REV. 423,423-24
(1983).
39 One of the most influential of these studies is found in the landmark work of psycholo-
gists Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert J. Solnit. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL.,
BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 17-20 (1979).
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foster care for children.40 While this knowledge once led to federal and state policies
designed to limit state intervention and reunify mothers and children, the persistent
problem of large numbers of children remaining for extended periods of time in foster
care led to a dramatic shift in state policy.4' Many experts believed the failure was
not in the policies favoring reunification but in the failure to implement them.42
Rather than focus on ensuring meaningful services to needy families, the political
response to the child welfare failures was to limit rather than expand the obligation
to provide those services.43
B. Motherhood Through Adoption: The Impact of ASFA on Poor Children and
Mothers
This shift from policies favoring reunification to policies encouraging quicker
termination of parental (maternal) rights and adoption culminated with the enactment
of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA).4 Under ASFA, states'
receipt of federal funds is conditioned upon establishing procedures that make child
welfare bureaucracies move more quickly to rule out parents as caretakers, making
children available for adoption sooner. Hearings to determine permanent placement
of children removed from parents must now begin no later than twelve months after
a child enters foster care, a reduction from the former eighteen-month limit.45 Termi-
nating parental rights for a child is required if the child has been removed from her
4 The findings of the court in Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153 (E.D.N.Y. 2003),
are instructive:
Another serious implication of removal is that it introduces children to
the foster care system which can be much more dangerous and debili-
tating than the home situation. Dr. Stark testified that foster homes are
rarely screened for the presence of domestic violence, and that the inci-
dence of abuse and child fatality in foster homes in New York City is
double that in the general population. Children in foster care often fail
to receive adequate medical care. Foster care placements can disrupt
the child's contact with community, school and siblings.
Id. at 199 (citations omitted).
4" See, e.g., Hilary Baldwin, Termination of Parental Rights: Statistical Study and Proposed
Solutions, 28 J. LEGIS. 239,251 (2002) (referring to the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2155, as an attempt to limit children's time in foster
care).
42 See, e.g., id.
4' For example, when members of Congress debated ASFA, they collected evidence that
lack of permanency resulted not because the "reasonable efforts" requirement had failed but
because of "overworked caseworkers [who] believed that children already in foster care were
safe and thus gave them and their families 'less attention than they deserved."' Id. at 257.
'4 Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2155.
41 See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C) (2005).
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home for fifteen of the last twenty-two months, or when an infant has been abandoned,
unless a compelling reason not to terminate parental rights exists.4 6 ASFA permits
states to bypass family reunification efforts entirely for those children subjected to
severe abuse or neglect.47 It also provides incentive payments to increase the number
of adoptions and new funding for states to promote and support adoptions. 48 Such
incentives are not provided for reunification with parents or other permanency plans
such as kinship care.49
Although there has been a modest decrease in children in foster care in the last
few years, the numbers are still alarmingly high and the numbers entering care have
continued to increase each year from 2000 through 2004.50 As was true under its
predecessor statutes, the vast majority of children removed from their homes under
ASFA are children of color5" who are removed because of parental neglect related
46 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E).
47 42 U.S.C. § 671 (a)(15)(A), (D). State law defines aggravating circumstances, but aban-
donment, torture, chronic abuse, and sexual abuse are generally included.
48 Under ASFA, the federal government pays states $4,000 multiplied by the amount by
which the number of foster child adoptions in the state during the fiscal year exceeds a base
number of foster child adoptions. See 42 U.S.C. § 673b(d)(1)(A).
49 In fact, states receive substantially more money when they remove kids than when they
prevent removal. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 672-74.
" Children's Def. Fund, Child Abuse and Neglect Fact Sheet 2 (Apr. 2005) [hereinafter
Fact Sheet] (finding that the number of children placed in foster care increased by thirty
percent in the last decade), available at http://www.childrensdefensefund.org/childwelfare/
abuse/factsheet2005.pdf. But see Children's Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
Trends in Foster Care and Adoption - FY 2000-2004, available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov-
programs/cb/statsresearch/afcars/trends.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2006) (finding that while
the number of children entering foster care increased between 2000 to 2004, the overall
number of children in foster care has decreased from 552,000 in 2000 to 518,000 in 2004).
Of course, the pattern of removing children rather than providing services to children in their
parents' care cannot be attributed entirely to the shortened timeframes in ASFA. As one
federal court found, increased media scrutiny after horrific deaths of children in foster care has
also contributed to this pattern:
Much of the actual policies as applied by ACS are driven by fear of an
untoward incident of child abuse that will result in criticism of the agency
and some of its employees. The concern over institutional self-protection,
rather than children's best interests, explains a good deal of ACS's pre-
disposition toward counterproductive separation of abused mothers and
their children.
Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 205 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
"1 See Fact Sheet, supra note 50, at 2 (reporting that at least fifty-nine percent of children
in foster care are children of color). Children of color are disproportionately represented in the
foster care system, as children of color only comprise forty-two percent of all children under
the age of eighteen in the United States. See Child Welfare League of Am., Nat'l Data
Analysis Sys., Children of Color in the Child Welfare System, available at http://ndas.cwla.
org/researchinfo/minority_child (last visited Jan. 3,2006). Among children of color, "[bilack
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to poverty. 2 Most recently, courts and commentators have recognized that within
this group of poor children, large numbers of children of battered mothers have suf-
fered from unnecessary separation from their mothers in child protection proceed-
ings. In a recent case in which a class of mothers and children challenged the New
York City's Administration for Children's Services' (ACS) policy of bringing neglect
actions against battered mothers, the court found:
The statistics, individual cases, expert testimony and admis-
sions of ACS employees demonstrate that many more separations
of abused mothers and their children are made by ACS than are
necessary for protection of the children.... In a large number of
instances ACS removes children first and then seeks court ap-
proval. Many such non-court ordered separations are unnecessary
and result in long periods of anguish for both mother and child
before the courts can reinstate the mother-child relationship.53
children represent sixteen percent of the general population but 37percent of the foster care
population." Fact Sheet, supra, at 2 (emphasis added).
52 See Martin Guggenheim, Somebody's Children: Sustaining the Family's Place in Child
Welfare Policy, 113 HARV. L. REv. 1716, 1735 (2000) (finding that as many as seventy per-
cent of children in foster care have suffered no abuse and could remain at home with the
adequate provision of financial services); Paul Anthony Wilhelm, Note, Permanency at What
Cost? Five Years of Imprudence Under the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 16
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHIcs & PUB. POL'Y 617, 631 (2002) (citing estimates that ten percent
of children in foster care are there because of serious abuse); see also DUNCAN LINDSEY, THE
WELFARE OF CHILDREN 139-56 (1994) (analyzing child welfare studies and concluding that
lack of income, not abuse, is the main reason most children are removed from their homes);
Fact Sheet, supra note 50, at 1-2.
Research indicates that children who live in families with annual in-
comes less than $15,000 are 22 times more likely to abused or neglected
than children living in families with annual incomes of $30,000 or more.
This higher rate can be attributed to the stress that poverty places on
parents and to the increased likelihood that child abuse and neglect will
be detected, reported and substantiated in low-income homes that are
more closely supervised by social services and law enforcement agencies.
Id. at 1 (citations omitted).
" Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 212, 214. See also Failure to Protect Working Group,
Charging Battered Mothers with "Failure to Protect": Still Blaming the Victim, 27 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 849, 872 (2000).
[Domestic violence] advocates now find themselves assisting battered
mothers who are losing their children to foster care and who are being
charged with abuse or neglect for failing to protect their children from
witnessing domestic violence. Mothers are punished and children are
traumatized by the separation while the perpetrator of the violence gen-
erally experiences few consequences.
[Vol. 14:969
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Furthermore, less than six out of ten children who are removed receive post-
investigation services.54 Not only are services not provided through the narrowed
"reasonable efforts" requirement that remained under ASFA, poor families also exper-
ienced dramatic cutbacks in general public support throughout the post-ASFA period.55
The lack of services and strict timelines under ASFA has led to record numbers of
mothers losing their status as parents through termination of parental rights.56
Given the apparent inevitability that certain mothers will lose that legal status
through termination proceedings under ASFA, why not prevent harm to children
from lack of permanency by refusing to confer legal recognition on mothers who are
poor, substance abusers, or otherwise meet a profile of likely social services inter-
vention? Why not make those parents take affirmative steps to "earn" the right to
attain legal status as mothers? Won't that finally put child welfare at the center of
parentage laws? The results for children under the accelerated approach under
ASFA suggest the answer to these questions is no. While some children would clearly
benefit from the possibility of immediate adoption, many more would suffer under
such a system.
14 CHILDREN's BUREAU, U.S. DEP'TOFHEALTH & HUMANSERVS., CHID MALTREATMENT
2003 ch. 6, available at http://acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cm03/chaptersix.htm (last visited
Feb. 8, 2006).
" See CHILDREN'S DEF. FUND, THE UNPROTECTED RECESSION: RECORD NUMBERS OF
FAMIJES HAVE No WORK AND No WELFARE IN 2001 (2003), available at http://www.
childrensdefense.org/pdf/noworknowelfare.pdf; JENNIFER MEZY ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET &
PoLIcy PRIORITIEs, REVERSING DIRECTION ON WELFARE REFORM: PRESIDENT'S BUDGET
CUTS CHILD CARE FOR MORE THAN 300,000 CHILDREN (Feb. 10, 2004) (noting that cuts in
federal funding for child care will gravely impact working families and families seeking to
make the transition from welfare to work), available at http://www.cbpp.org/2-10-04wel,
htm; Nina Bernstein, Swelling Shelters, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 2,2001, at B3; Nina Bernstein, Use
of Shelters by Families Sets Record in City, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2001, at 1 ("The number of
homeless families lodging nightly in New York City's shelter system has risen higher than
ever and the trend is accelerating .... ); Press Release, Ctr. on Budget & Policy Priorities,
Many Low-Income Families Would Lose Federal Housing Assistance Under Proposed
Funding Cuts: New Projections Show Potential Effects in Each Community (Mar. 17, 2004),
available at http://www.cbpp.org/3-17-04hous-pr.htm.
56 See CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., AFCARS REPORT
#9-CURRENT ESTIMATES AS OF AUGUST 2004, available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/
cb/dis/afcars/publications/afcars.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2006) (finding that by September 30,
2002, 67,000 children became wards of the state through termination of their parental rights).
This trend occurred even before AFSA as the political tide began to swing in favor of adoption.
See Martin Guggenheim, The Effects of Recent Trends to Accelerate the Termination of
Parental Rights of Children in Foster Care - An Empirical Analysis in Two States, 29 FAM.
L.Q. 121, 127-32 (1995) (analyzing data from two states - New York and Michigan - and
finding an "unmistakable trend" of increasing numbers of children becoming wards of the state
through policies that overemphasize "termination of parental rights as a major tool of perma-
nency planning").
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Since its enactment, commentators have expressed concern about ASFA's impact
on families, particularly ppor women.57 Despite the tendency to pit mothers' and
children's interests against one another, when mothers suffer, their children are
harmed.58 Law professor and child welfare attorney Martin Guggenheim has ex-
plored the "flawed premise" underlying the notion of "children's rights" as separate
from "parents rights":
Regrettably, a leading characteristic of the children's rights
movement is its propensity to separate children's interests from
their parents'. It is also its most egregious error.
Children are inherently dependent for much of the time they
remain in the category of "child." For this reason, it is highly prob-
lematic to discuss the rights of children in a wide variety of con-
texts without simultaneously considering the rights of the people
on whom they are dependent. In this culture, this means their
5' Predictions that ASFA might hurt parents and children began during its debate in
Congress. See, e.g., The Safe Adoptions and Family Environments Act: Hearing to Consider
S.511 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 105th Cong. 54, 62 (1997) (statement of Sister
Rose Logan, Catholic Charities USA) ("[T]here is a danger that [ASFA's] very strong em-
phasis on adoption... will be a signal to state and local officials that they don't have to do
anything to reunite families or keep them together, even when the abuse or neglect is not
chronic or severe."); see also Adoption andSupportofAbused Children: Testimony Submitted
to the Senate Finance Comm. for the Hearing on the Pass Act, S.1195, 105th Cong. 141,
147-48 (1997) (statement of the Child Welfare League of America) (stating that the com-
bination of ASFA's stringent time limits and failure to increase preventive or reunification
services may result in prematurely sending a child home or unnecessarily terminating parental
rights).
58 See, e.g., Karen Czapanskiy, Interdependencies, Families, and Children, 39 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 957 (1999) (proposing an "interdependency theory," in which "every child
needs a caregiver, and every caregiver needs support from other people and institutions," to
serve children's best interests); Marsha Garrison, Parents' Rights vs. Children's Interests:
The Case of the Foster Child, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 371, 373 (1996) (rejecting
the perceived conflict between parents' and children's rights given "the general emphasis on
relationship protection that has characterized advocacy on behalf of children"); see also
Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 235 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
The interest in not being forcibly separated by the state is shared by
parents and children. This right to the preservation of family integrity
encompasses the reciprocal rights of both parent and children. It is the
interest in the companionship, care, custody and management of his or
her children, and of the children in not being dislocated from the emo-
tional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association
with the parent.
Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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parents. Attempting to consider the rights and needs of (very
young) children without simultaneously taking into account the
rights and needs of their parents is akin to attempting to isolate
someone's arm from the rest of their body.59
But even if one accepts the premise of "children's rights" and considers ASFA
strictly from a child's perspective, its harm to children as a form of parentage dis-
establishment law is apparent. The impact on children begins with the removal stage.
Few would argue that ASFA's exemption of cases of severe abuse from family pres-
ervation requirements does anything but protect children who need state intervention
to protect them. But, for the majority of these children who may be removed un-
necessarily or could be reunified with the "reasonable efforts" required by law, this
approach is not in their best interests. The disruption and loss of a primary caretaker
- in this case overwhelmingly biological mothers - is devastating to children. 6°
And, given the record numbers of parental rights terminations under ASFA, we know
that few of these children are reunified with their parents.6' And there is little
evidence that removal will result in permanency. While adoptions have increased
under ASFA,62 these adoptions have not kept pace with the number of children left
59 MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT'S WRONG WITH CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 13-14 (2005).
6o Again, the record in Nicholson provides substantial evidence of the harm to children
when removed from their primary caretakers:
Several expert witnesses... testified about the primacy of the parent-child
bond and the effect on a child if he or she is separated from a parent....
The attachment between parent and child forms the basis of who we are
as humans and the continuity of that attachment is essential to a child's
natural development.
Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 198-99. See also Joseph Goldstein, Medical Carefor the Child
at Risk: On State Supervention of Parental Autonomy, 86 YALE L.J. 645,649-50 (1977).
No other animal is for so long after birth in so helpless a state that its sur-
vival depends on continuous nurture by an adult. Although breaking or
weakening the ties to the responsible and responsive adults may have
different consequences for children of different ages, there is little doubt
that such breach in the familial bond will be detrimental to the child's
well-being.
Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 199 (quoting Goldstein, supra, at 649-50). The author's own
experience representing children, parents, and other caretakers in the child protection system
confirms these studies. One visit to a juvenile court waiting room, where children in foster
care have the opportunity to visit with their birthparents from whose homes they have been
removed, would illustrate this point.
61 See supra note 56.
61 In the year prior to ASFA, 31,000 children were adopted. In the 2000 fiscal year, more
than 45,000 children were adopted. See M. Carmela Welte, Adoption and Safe Families Act:
Has It Made a Difference?, CONNECTION, Summer 2003, available at http://casanet.org/
library/adoption/afsa-has-made-a-difference.htm.
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without parents because of terminations under ASFA.63 The children left behind in
permanent foster care status are disproportionately African American and, as they
age, are practically unadoptable.64
Given this experience, there is considerable risk to children in requiring mothers
to seek state intervention to establish parentage. If ASFA is any indicator, such a re-
quirement would result in substantially more children becoming orphans, with all the
attendant harm. Past experience with child protection courts in this country reveals
that when poor mothers are before the court, they will face a system where race and
economic status of the mothers are the best predictors of whether their children will
be removed from them and whether they will ultimately lose their parental rights.65
Just as we cannot expect dramatic changes in the amount of funding for fragile
families, 66 changes in parentage laws cannot remove patterns of bias in the child
welfare bureaucracies and court systems. And we know that children suffer when
they are removed from their birthmothers.67 This is true even if they are placed in
good, stable foster care.68 But they suffer even more when, as is more commonly the
case, children experience several placements in substandard care.69
The failure of ASFA to accomplish widespread permanency for poor children
through adoption makes it clear that, even if the goal of ideal parentage through adop-
tion is accepted, such a goal is achievable for relatively few children. Some children
will inevitably have to be removed from the care of abusive and chronically unfit
63 Fact Sheet, supra note 50, at 2 (noting that 532,000 children were reported to be in
foster care as of September 30, 2002).
4 See Edmund Mech, Public Social Services to Minority Children and Their Families,
in CHILDREN IN NEED OF ROOTS 133 (R.O. Washington & Joan Baros-Van Hull eds., 1985)
(finding that once African American children enter foster care, they remain there longer, are
moved more often, and receive less desirable placements than white children); see also Josh
Green, Urban Inst., Who Will Adopt the Foster Care Children Left Behind? 1 (Urban Inst./
Caring for Children Brief No. 2, June 2003), available at http://www.urban.org/Uploaded
PDF/310809_caring.forchildren 2.pdf ("Compared with children still in foster care, those
who are adopted are younger and more likely to be female, Caucasian, and Hispanic....
[T]hose awaiting adoption tend to be... older, male, and black ... " (citation omitted)).
65 See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
66 It is, of course, difficult to resist advocating for increased funding for additional ser-
vices to poor families as a way to help promote fit, caring parents in all children's lives. Such
funding is probably a political impossibility in the United States in 2006. But, in a country
that spends at least $50 billion a year on federal funds for war, it seems at least plausible that
increases in the $16-17 billion for public benefits to poor families could be made. See Office
of Mgm't & Budget, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2007 1 (2006),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2007/pdf/budget/defense.pdf.
67 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
68 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
69 See, e.g., Baldwin, supra note 41, at 250, 254 (noting that most children are placed in
more than one foster family and "the detrimental affect [sic] of foster care on children"); see
also supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
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parents, even if such removal results in permanent foster care. The best hope for the
remaining children, however, is to focus efforts on reunification. Changes in parent-
age laws for mothers - the child welfare scheme - should, therefore, shift focus to
ensure fulfillment of reasonable efforts mandate so as to increase opportunities for
reunification and limit state intervention.
CONCLUSION
The matter of determining what categories of people will best fill the role of legal
parents is extremely complex. Designing an ideal parentage statute will not address
all of the complex political and socio-economic issues that affect the legal recognition
of parents in this country. Even if the focus is limited to what laws would best pro-
mote fit, caring parents in children's lives, legal reform must go beyond parentage
laws. A wide range of legal regulation determines who may acquire and maintain the
status of legal parent, particularly for the poor and African Americans.
This Article has focused on one group of children - those facing legal proceed-
ings in which they are at risk of losing their mothers, often the only parent in their
lives. Even among this group, the range of circumstances in individual families is
broad. But, as a starting point for designing parentage laws that have child welfare
as their primary and overarching goal, we must ensure existing laws do not leave
children without mothers unless that result is absolutely required to protect the child
from harm. The following proposals are intended to further that goal by guiding the
reform of the cross section of rules, policies, and statutes that regulate maternal status
in poor families.
A. Initial Recognition of Legal Parenthood Should Occur Under Established
Presumptions Without the Need for Significant State Intervention
Requiring an affihrmative showing of fitness before legal recognition of parental
status will hurt poor children. Their parents (a) lack the resources to participate mean-
ingfully in court proceedings to meet such legal burdens,70 and (b) face bias and
70 As a general proposition, unless there is a statutory right to counsel for parents in child
welfare cases, poor mothers are unlikely to be represented by counsel in legal proceedings
involving access to their children. See, e.g., Steven K. Berenson, A Family Law Residency
Program? A Modest Proposal in Response to the Burdens Created by Self-Represented
Litigants in Family Court, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 105, 110 (2001) (describing a 1991-92 study of
sixteen large urban areas nationwide that found that seventy-two percent of all domestic
relations cases involved at least one unrepresented party); see also DEP'T OF FAM. ADMIN,
MD. JUDICIARY, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE MARYLAND CIRcurr COURT FAMILY DIVISIONS
AND FAMILY SERVICES PROGRAMS 30 (2003) (reporting that sixty-four percent of litigants
in family disputes in Maryland were self-represented), available at http://www.courts.state.
md.us/ family/annualreport03.pdf. Even where counsel is appointed, the potential for mothers
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prejudice in legal proceedings where they are at risk of arbitrary exclusion as parents
based on race and economic status.71
B. The Unalterable Differences in Prenatal Investment Between Mothers and
Fathers Require Gender-Specific Laws for Initial Recognition of Parenthood
Notwithstanding the need to protect both poor mothers and poor fathers from the
risks of state intervention to establish parental status, laws affecting parentage should
recognize that the different circumstances of biological mothers and fathers require
some modest affirmative steps on the part of fathers to establish parentage that are not
imposed on mothers who achieve that status by giving birth. These steps include
requiring an affidavit or consent to judgment to establish legal paternity after the state
has fully informed putative fathers of the legal consequences of such action, includ-
ing advising such fathers of the importance and availability without cost of genetic
testing.72
C. The Birthmother Shall Be the Presumed Mother of Her Child
Given the risk of harm to children from extended foster care that still routinely
follows removal of children, the state's burden in rebutting the maternal presumption
must be made greater and more specific. To achieve that heightened burden, the
court must make a meaningful inquiry to determine that the state (a) has met its
burden to make reasonable efforts to reunify the child with her birthmother, and (b)
has demonstrated, to the extent possible, through the identification of an adoptive
resource, that continued removal and termination of parental rights will provide
greater benefits to the child than return to the birthparent. 73
losing children through their lack of understanding and inability to fully participate in legal
proceedings is high. See, e.g., In re Blessen H., 877 A.2d. 161 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005)
(rejecting a mother's challenge of her attorney's waiver of a right to a contested hearing in
a "Child in Need of Assistance" proceeding where the mother claimed the waiver was not
"knowing and intelligent").
71 See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
72 These steps for establishing paternity are more fully described in Murphy, supra note
2, at 375-77.
7' The state's ability to ensure that children will not lose biological mothers without a
guarantee of adoption have been improved by new laws in a few states that create proceed-
ings where a biological parent can consent to the termination of parental rights on the con-
dition that a child is adopted by a specific family, often a relative. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN.,
FAM. LAW § 5-320(b)(1); see also Joan Little, Major Changes in Adoption Laws Will Speed
Adoptions in CINA Cases, MD. FAM. MONTHLY, Jan. 2006, at 5.
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D. Opportunities Should Be Offered for Poor Families to Make Their Own
Decisions About Parentage Issues
Agreements that are not harmful to children and maintain the involvement of
multiple parents and "parent figures" in a child's life should be recognized and sub-
stituted forjudicially imposed decisions. While legitimate questions have been raised
about the risks to the less powerful when decisions are made in the relatively private
and informal mediation setting, the value of mediation as a way of resolving the kind
of parentage disputes described in this paper is worth considering.74 "Family group
conferencing"75 in child protection cases can also be a way to restore a central role
for birthparents in the decision-making about their children's long-term care. Some
states have enacted legislation that provides for legal recognition of agreements that
permit contact between biological parents and their children after the formal termi-
nation of parental rights.76 These laws should increase the potential for using these
forms of alternative dispute resolution to maintain the presence of mothers in their
children's lives.
" A Hastings Center study looking at "the ethical, social, and legal issues surrounding
DNA-based identity testing as it affects families" notes some preliminary positive experience
with mediation in paternity cases. See Mary R. Anderlik, Disestablishment Suits: What Hath
Science Wrought?, 4 J. CTR. FAMs., CHILD. & CTs. 3, 3 (2003). See also id. at 19 (describing
judicial opinions in California and Maine in which mediation was proffered as a way to re-
solve in a paternity dispute). The author's experience in representing children in paternity
disestablishment cases supports the notion that court-based mediation programs may have
some potential for reaching decisions that serve the best interests of children. See Murphy,
supra note 2, at 368 n.207 (describing the resolution of a case in which, despite limitations
in the governing law that would have produced a different decision, the parties reached an
agreement preserving a father in a child's life).
71 See Susan M. Chandler & Marilou Giovannucci, Family Group Conferences: Trans-
forming Traditional Child Welfare Policy and Practice, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 216 (2004) (de-
scribing the positive consequences for children when child welfare cases are resolved by
bringing together birth families, extended families and relevant community resources); see
also Hon. Leonard P. Edwards, Mediation in Child Protection Cases, J. CTR. FAMS., CHILD.
& CTS. 57 (2004) (describing the problems with the traditional adversarial process for resolv-
ing child abuse and neglect proceedings, and promoting the use of mediation that broadly
defines and includes the parties in interests, promotes child safety, and produces agreements
that require little or no post-agreement state supervision or intervention). But see Amy Sinden,
"Why Won't Mom Cooperate?": A Critique ofInformality in Child Welfare Proceedings, 11
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 339 (1999) (warning about the dangers to mothers when child
protection proceedings are marked by informality).
76 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-308(a)(1) (2006). Of course, the potential
still exists that mothers will feel coerced to consent to termination of their parental rights by
trading the guarantee of some contact with their children for the possibility of no contact after
complex legal proceedings in which they may be unrepresented or poorly represented by
counsel.
2006]
986 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 14:969
These suggested reforms are not intended to resolve the range of parentage issues
courts must face in cases where more than one adult is competing for the status of
legal mother, nor do they address some of the broader structural issues in welfare and
child support laws that contribute to the loss of parents in children's lives. Rather,
they are principles by which to measure the impact of laws affecting maternal status
on children who most need protection.
